We study how two distinct forms of globalisation, trade cost reductions and opening up of trade in previously shielded sectors, affect sector-specific wages, employment levels and aggregate welfare in a two-country model of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) with partly unionised labour markets. We find that both forms of globalisation increase union coverage, and they also lead to a lower union wage premium in shielded sectors. In contrast, the union wage premium in open sectors and aggregate welfare are affected differently by the two types of globalisation. Trade cost reductions in open sectors always lead to higher union wage premia and to lower aggregate welfare, while an increased number of open sectors lowers the union wage premium, and it may also increase welfare. JEL-Classification: F12, F15, F16
Introduction
There is what appears to be a secular trend towards greater economic integration, but at the same time sectors that produce non-traded goods, and are therefore exempt from international competition, still make up an important part of the world economy. 1 In this paper we explore the implications of economic integration in countries where some sectors of the economy are shielded from international competition, and where the workforce is partially unionised.
A large theoretical literature suggests that the openness of a sector to international trade is a key determinant of a union's ability in this sector to negotiate a premium over the wage workers would get in a perfectly competitive labour market. The standard framework employed in the literature is the unionised oligopoly model with symmetric countries, and Sørensen (1993) and Huizinga (1993) have shown independently from each other that in this framework moving from autarky to free trade reduces the union wage premium.
Subsequently Naylor (1998 Naylor ( , 1999 has shown that this early theoretical result, while in line with the public perception that globalisation has a negative effect on labour unions' ability to set high wages, needs to be qualified. In particular, Naylor has pointed out that the effect of trade liberalisation on the union wage is non-monotonic: there is a critical level of trade costs below which unions switch to a low-wage strategy, thereby allowing the unionised firm to become competitive in the export market. Further incremental reductions in trade costs lead to an increase in union wages until free trade is reached, at which point the wage has regained some but not all of its initial loss. 2 This suggests that, 1 See the evidence provided in De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Bettendorf and Dewachter (2007) . 2 Munch and Skaksen (2002) allow for the presence of both fixed and variable trade costs and show that the results are sensitive to which of these costs are lowered. Bastos, Kreickemeier and Wright (2009) modify the symmetric unionised oligopoly model by introducing wage bargaining and open shop unions, and they show that in this case wages under free trade may be higher than under autarky. There is also a large literature looking at an asymmetric setup with unions present in only one of the countries, see Brander and Spencer (1988) , and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) . The asymmetric oligopoly model has been extended by Lommerud, Meland and Sørgard (2003) to allow for FDI, while Straume (2003) and Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2006) What is lacking in the theoretical literature just described, but has been a corner stone in much of the earlier trade literature with perfectly competitive goods and factor markets, is the general equilibrium link between sectors of traded and non-traded goods induced by the mobility of workers. 3 Similarly, one would expect that for trade unions the general equilibrium links between traded and non-traded sectors should matter, but how exactly is not well understood so far. One compelling story about the nature of these links is told in Moene and Wallerstein (1995) . Referring to the Scandinavian tradition of "solidaristic wage bargaining", whereby union wages were centrally negotiated for both traded and non-traded sectors, they point out that the desired effect of this arrangement has been to keep the wages of construction workers, who are mainly employed in non-traded sectors, low. Due to the lack of international competition in these sectors, profits and therefore potential wages under decentralised bargaining were high. Since construction workers are to some extent employed in traded sectors as well, this would have driven up labour cost in these sectors, and harmed the wage prospects of unionised production workers in the sectors open to international competition. 4 In the present paper, we set up a multi-sector general equilibrium model that also features traded and non-traded goods, with labour unions present in a subset of both types of sectors. The presence of non-unionised sectors means that there is an endogenously determined competitive wage that clears the labour market. The ability of unions to set wages in organised sectors, whether open or closed to international competition, is affected by the competitive wage, which provides the outside option for workers and does not depend on the trading status of the sector in question. The basis for our framework is the model of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) by Neary (2009) featuring a continuum 3 See Corden and Neary (1982) and Neary (1988) . 4 See also Rasmussen (1992) . In the literature on exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting the co-existence of shielded and non-shielded sectors has also featured prominently, with examples including Vartiainen (2002) , Holden (2003) and Meland (2006) . of sectors, each of which has a small and exogenous number of firms that compete with each other in Cournot fashion in an integrated world market. 5 In order to bring to the forefront the role played by unions as well as the distinction between open and shielded sectors, we eliminate from the model all other asymmetries between sectors. In particular, we abstract from inter-sectoral differences in production technologies. In contrast to Neary 
The model
We consider a world of two countries, Home and Foreign, that are identical in all respects.
Due to the assumed symmetry, we can focus on the Home country throughout, in the understanding that the results hold for the Foreign economy by analogy. Variables pertaining to the Foreign economy are denoted by an asterisk ( * ).
There is a continuum of sectors indexed by z ∈ [0, 1], each featuring n firms that compete in Cournot fashion. The marginal product of labour is identical in all sectors and normalised to unity. Markets are segmented, as in Brander and Krugman (1983) , and if a good is traded, there is a specific per unit tariff τ . Following Neary (2009), we consider a representative consumer in the home country with utility function
where x(z) is consumption of good z. 7 The budget constraint is
Utility maximisation yields inverse demand for good z as
where λ is the marginal utility of income, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint. Substituting for x(z) in the budget constraint gives an expression for the marginal utility of income:
where
are the first and second moment, respectively, of the price distribution.
Since each sector constitutes only a marginal part of the economy as a whole, all firms treat the marginal utility of income parametrically. This implies that perceived inverse demand functions are linear (see eq. (2)), which is convenient for the discussion of oligopoly behaviour, and it is a key part of the GOLE framework.
The indirect utility function is derived by substituting for x(z), and subsequently for λ, in the direct utility function. We eventually get When modeling the labour market we follow Naylor (1998 Naylor ( , 1999 and adopt a monopoly union framework. In each of the unionised sectors there is a single union, and its objective is to maximise rents. Firms subsequently choose the level of employment. As in Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), each union sets the wage w(z) according to
where l(z) is the total employment in sector z and w c is the competitive wage. Due to the assumption of a continuum of sectors, unions are small in the economy as a whole, and therefore treat w c and λ parametrically. If applicable, unions also treat the foreign union wage parametrically, since wage setting occurs simultaneously in all unionised sectors. As usual, the game is solved by backwards induction.
Partial Equilibrium
In partial equilibrium, all endogenous variables are determined as a function of the competitive wage w c and the marginal utility of income λ. We look separately at equilibrium for the shielded and open sectors.
Shielded sectors
In non-unionised shielded sectors, firm output is given by the standard result for Cournot competition between n identical firms, where the marginal cost is given by the competitive wage:
with a ≡ a/λ and b ≡ b/λ. In unionised shielded sectors, the profit maximising output is given by an equation identical to (6) , with the union wage w u n replacing w c :
Quantity choices by firms are preceded by union wage-setting. The union wage w u n is the solution to arg max
and straightforward calculations lead to
Due to the assumed symmetry between the countries, w c = w c * and w u n = w u * n .
Open sectors
In the non-unionised open sectors, we have the standard results from the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) . Exports occur if and only if τ is below a critical level that is implicitly given by the condition that the effective marginal cost of serving the export market, w c + τ , equals the price in this market in the absence of trade, (a + nw c )/(n + 1), which is also the marginal revenue of the exporting firm for the first unit sold abroad. For trade costs below this threshold, there is competition between n domestic firms and n foreign firms, where the latter have higher effective (trade-cost inclusive) marginal cost. The profit maximising output levels of Home firms in the domestic and export market, respectively, are given by
, where x i (z) is output for serving the home market and y i (z) denotes output sold on the export market. Exploiting the fact that w c = w c * in equilibrium due to the assumption of identical countries, we get:
In the unionised sectors, the critical level of tariffs below which trade occurs cannot be determined by simply comparing autarky price and marginal cost, since the marginal cost of serving the export market is partially determined by the union wage, which in turn is a choice variable of the union. We show in the appendix that a critical τ can nevertheless be determined, and that it is strictly lower than the critical level of trade costs in the non-unionised sectors. For the moment, let us assume that the actual trade cost is below this threshold. The equilibrium is then determined in a two stage game, where the firms' output choices in the second stage are given by
with union wages w(z) and w * (z) determined in the first stage. The rent-maximising wage for the domestic union, for a given foreign union wage w * (z), is the solution to arg max
where the term in round brackets is the profit maximising output x i (z)+y i (z) of a domestic exporting firm. Solving for w(z) gives the domestic union's best reply function:
There is an analogous best reply function for the foreign union, and due to this symmetry, the union wages in the sectors producing tradables are given by
Using this equality of the domestic and foreign union wage, profit maximising output levels in the domestic and export markets follow in analogy to (8) as:
The difference between union wages in the shielded and open sectors (provided that trade in the latter actually occurs) is given by the difference between (7) and (9):
We know from (6) that (a − w c ) is positive, and hence union wages are higher in those sectors that are shielded from international competition.
General Equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we are free in the choice of a numeraire. Following Neary (2009), it turns out to be particularly convenient to choose marginal utility for this role, which implies that all prices are defined relative to the cost of marginal utility, which is given by λ −1 , the inverse of the marginal utility of income. Wages w/(λ −1 ) = λw have the interpretation of real wages at the margin (Neary, 2009), and similarly for prices λp. It is instructive to re-write indirect utility function (4) in terms of prices λp. Using (3), we get
which shows that utility depends negatively on the second moment of real prices at the margin, λp. This is explained by the fact that the sub-utility for each good is concave, and hence the representative consumer benefits from spreading a given quantity of aggregate consumption evenly across the different goods. 9 While aggregate consumption is of course determined in general equilibrium, in our particular version of the GOLE framework with identical labour input coefficients in all sectors and full employment, the determination is particularly simple: Aggregate output is constant and equal to L, and hence this must be true for aggregate consumption as well. Importantly, it follows that the first moment of prices is constant in our model. This is so since all perceived inverse demand curves (2) are identical and linear, and therefore each price increase must be matched one for one by a price decrease elsewhere in order to keep aggregate demand constant. With a constant average price, (4 ) implies that utility is decreasing in the variance of real prices at the margin.
In order to economise on notation and terminology, we now simply set λ −1 ≡ 1, and no longer make explicit the distinction between nominal prices on the one hand and real prices at the margin on the other hand, in the understanding that in the remainder of the paper we are always talking about the latter. With the normalisation of λ −1 , general equilibrium effects between sectors are only transmitted via the competitive wage w c . It is determined by the condition that aggregate labour demand of all sectors combined be equal to exogenous labour supply L. This full employment condition in its most general form is given by
where y i (z) is zero for shielded sector firms. We focus throughout on the case where τ is sufficiently low for trade to occur in the open sectors z ∈ [0, α). Using the partial equilibrium expressions derived above, it is now straightforward to substitute for x i (z) and y i (z), noting that with the help of (7) and (9) output in unionised sectors can also be written as a function of the competitive wage. We get
where K ≡ (2 − β)(2n 2 + 5n + 2) + α[β(2n 2 + n − 2) + 2n + 4] > 0. With the competitive wage thus expressed as a function of model parameters only, it is now possible to find closed-form solutions for all the endogenous variables of the model in general equilibrium.
Comparative statics
In our framework with traded non-traded goods it is possible to distinguish between globalisation at the intensive margin, modeled as a decrease in trade costs in those sectors already open to trade, and globalisation at the extensive margin, modeled as an increase in the proportion of sectors producing tradable goods. We consider both aspects of globalisation in turn.
The intensive margin of globalisation
Partially differentiating (10) gives
and hence a marginal reduction in trade costs increases the competitive wage. This effect is explained by the fact that trade liberalisation increases the labour demand of firms in open sectors, ceteris paribus: For a constant level of w c and w u t , a reduction in trade costs leads to lower output for the home market due to increased import competition, but to higher output for the export market, since firms become more competitive there. It can be seen in (8) and (8 ) Using the definition of K, it follows that ∂ 2 w c /(∂τ ∂α) < 0, which means that the effect of a change in τ on the competitive wage is stronger the larger the proportion of sectors that produce tradable goods. This is very intuitive: The partial equilibrium effect on labour demand in each sector is independent of α, and with more sectors experiencing trade liberalisation the effect on aggregate labour demand increases.
The effect of trade liberalisation on the union wage in shielded and open sectors, respectively, follows from (7), (9) and (11):
and hence lower trade costs mean that unions in both shielded and open sectors set higher wages. The first effect, present in both sectors, results from the general equilibrium increase in the competitive wage just described, which in the absence of any adjustment in the union wage would decrease the union wage premium. With a higher competitive wage the union rent (w u − w c )l is no longer maximised for the original wage-employment combination, and it becomes optimal for unions to opt for higher wages. In the open sectors, there is an additional, direct effect known from partial equilibrium models (Naylor 1998 (Naylor , 1999 : With higher output due to lower trade cost, the labour demand of unionised firms becomes less elastic, unions can therefore increase wages at a lower cost in terms of employment, and this is therefore what they choose to do.
While a trade cost reduction leads to increased union wages in both shielded and open sectors, the change in the absolute union wage premium is sector specific. We get:
where the inequality sign follows from the fact that ∂w c /∂τ > −(1/2) whenever α < 1.
Trade liberalisation therefore leads to a decrease of the union wage premium in shielded sectors, while the union wage premium in the open sectors increases. In order to see the economic intuition for this result, consider the counterfactual situation where the unions increase wages in line with the competitive wage, and hence the union wage premium is constant. In the shielded sectors, this wage increase would lead to a decrease in employment, according to (6 ) . In analogy to our earlier argument, with lower employment it is no longer rent maximising for the union to demand the original wage premium, and it accepts a lower premium in return for a smaller decrease in employment. In the open sectors, a constant union wage premium would lead to higher employment due to the Naylor-effect described above. It is therefore optimal for unions to set yet higher wages, thereby sacrificing part of the employment increase that would otherwise have occurred.
The results are summarised as follows. Comparing (6) to (6 ) and (8) to (8 ) In order to gauge the effect of trade liberalisation on the overall share of the workforce employed in unionised firms, one has to aggregate these sector-specific effects, and furthermore take into account that the share of the workforce employed in shielded sectors, L s /L, changes as trade costs are lowered. Formally, the latter effect can be derived by noting that L s /L, from eqs. (6), (6 ) and (7), is equal to
Since the competitive wage increases in the course of trade liberalisation, as shown above in eq. (11), there is a reallocation of workers towards the open sectors when trade costs fall.
Taking these general equilibrium effects into account, we are able to show the following: Proof. See the appendix.
That welfare unambiguously falls as a consequence of a reduction in marginal trade costs stands in marked contrast to the result derived in the tradable-goods-only framework of , who find that trade liberalisation has no effect on welfare.
In their case, since trade liberalisation affects all sectors equally and prices stay the same as a consequence, the consumption levels of all goods are unchanged. In our model, with high prices rising and low prices falling, consumption levels across goods become more unequal. Since overall output is constant, this reduces welfare due to the concavity of the utility function. Proof. It is shown in the appendix that ∂w c /∂α > 0. Using (7) and (9) it follows that
The extensive margin of globalisation
Lastly, ∂(L u /L)/∂α > 0 is shown in the appendix.
Intuitively, for a given value of w c , output -and therefore labour demand -increases in 
We cannot use this simple intuition for the analysis of an incremental increase in α considered here since at intermediate levels of α there are now four prices to consider, rather than just two at a time as in (16) . All four prices increase with higher α due to the increase in wages, and at the same time the weight of the lower prices in the traded goods sectors (we have p u n > p u t and p n n > p n t ) is increased, leaving the average constant. It is clear from Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) that the welfare effect of marginally increasing α must be positive for at least some ranges of α, since going all the way from autarky to free trade increases welfare. We can in fact show the following: 
Conclusion
In this paper we study the effects of globalisation on labour markets and welfare when Solving for τ, this gives us
This is a less strict condition than the above restriction calculated for the unionised open sector, so τ < τ * is sufficient for two way trade to occur in both unionised and nonunionised sectors. We will thus assume that τ < τ * . However, wherever it suffices to use τ < τ * * in a proof and it simplifies the expressions, we will use that instead.
Proof of Proposition 2
The fraction of the labour force that is employed in unionised firms is given by 
Proof of Proposition 3
The second moment of prices is given by
and this can be written as µ 2 =a(a − 2bL) + (1 − α)(4 − 3β) K 2 (n + 2) (2n + 1) bL + α (n + 2 − β) nτ 2 + α (n + 2) 2 − (2n + 3)β K 2 4(n + 1)bL − (1 − α) (2 − β) nτ 2 . ∂τ ≤ 0, where the inequality is strict unless α = 0 or α = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
Partially differentiating w c with respect to α leads to:
∂w c ∂α = 2 (n + 1) (n + 2) (2n + 1) 2βn 2 + 4 − 2β + βn + 2n bL − (2 − β) (n + 2 − β) nτ nK 2
Since ∂ 2 w c /∂α∂τ < 0, ∂w c ∂α ≥ ∂w c ∂α τ =τ * * = 2βbL (2n + 1) (n + 2) (n + 1) K (αβn + (2 − β) (n + 2)) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Evaluating (18) must be decreasing in τ, implying ∂ 2 µ 2 ∂α∂τ α=1 ≥ ∂ 2 µ 2 ∂α∂τ α=1,τ =τ * * = 1 4 n 2 Lbβ n + β (n + 2 − β) 2 (n + 1) > 0.
In analogy to the previous argument, this implies that
is increasing in τ. Thus ∂µ 2 ∂α α=1 ≤ ∂µ 2 ∂α α=1,τ =τ * * = − 1 4 b 2 L 2 βn n 2 + n(6 − 5β) + 8(1 − β) (n + 2 − β)
By continuity, there is also a range of α ≤ 1 near α = 1 where ∂µ 2 ∂α < 0. To illustrate that both ∂µ 2 ∂α > 0 and ∂µ 2 ∂α < 0 can happen for lower levels of α, let for instance τ = 0 and n = 2. Evaluating ∂µ 2 ∂α at α = 0 yields
which is negative for β ∈ ( 
